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Imperial culture and cultural imperialism 
Hie case of India 
Dietrich Harth 
"Specifity is not just there. India is not just there." 
— Immanuel Wallerstein 
Introduction 
"Imperialism" in English usually means the dominion or autocratic 
rule of a sovereign, be it an individual (a king or emperor) or a collective 
actor (a constitutional government). Looking at the history of India 
covering a time-span of roughly 100 years, i.e. from about 1750 until 
about 1860, the dominant "imperial cultures" to be put into focus will 
mainly be those which historians usually identify with the Moghul 
Empires. "Cultural imperialism" on the other hand is nothing else but 
a shorthand formula contracting the really monumental enterprise 
of the British of that time to appropriate the South-Asian country, 
also expressing their insensible efforts to violently shape the divergent 
cultures of the subcontinent in conformity with a homemade vision of 
civilizational standards. 
Framing "culture" as a scholarly applicable key-concept usually means 
to consciously or unconsciously connect to former patterns of theoretical 
thinking. My own memory of those patterns is shaped by a concept of 
cultural pluralism that can be compared with the notion of culture first 
introduced into anthropological discourse by Franz Boas. It is a concept 
that very well fits the many-coloured, variously patterned web of Indian 
cultures because it not only favors cultural diversity and co-existence 
of the diverse, but it also is—at least in the researcher's mind—akin to 
relativism. In fact, the position marked by that choice is well known 
because of its ties with a tradition of great influence represented by the 
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name of Johann Gottfr ied Herder. There is in any case something about 
it: to combine the modern anthropological understanding (Boas) with 
that of the—if I may say so—classical philosopher of culture (Herder). 
For Herder saw the dignity and value of each individual culture, as he 
put it, enclosed in itself like the gravitation centre in a globe. That means 
that any individual culture has to be studied in its own rights, or to give 
it a hermeneutical twist, by methodically exploring it from within. This 
is, of course, a maxim which makes the comparison of different cultures a 
difficult task. It reminds us at least that one of the indispensable conditions 
in comparative cultural studies is the overt existence of similarities of 
different sorts shared by the cultures chosen for comparison. 
By that last remark I also want to emphasize that behind the imperial 
culture and the cultural imperialism mentioned in the headline of my 
talk are hidden indeed two very different cultural patterns of the past, 
represented on the one side by traditional India, on the other side by the 
British Empire, a society that for a long time was in the position of a 
modernist avant-garde. Of course, the relation between both to a large 
part was not so much based on similarities than on deep going differences 
and hostile oppositions. There is, therefore, less reason to compare but 
enough reason to watch the interaction of both cultures before the 
backdrop of explosive confrontations and cultural violence. However, the 
argument of my paper is that relations between two complex and dynamic 
cultural worlds—especially if these relations oscillate for a considerable 
historical time between recognition and aggression—the crucial point (I 
say) is that in this case both cultural worlds will definitely change their 
characteristics, at least by degrees; and they will do that primarily by 
cooperating in order to bridge the gap in between. 
Regarding the semantic width of the concept of culture I do not 
restrict it to art, science or religion. Instead, in what follows I will use 
the concept under systemic premises, i. e. as an idea interconnected with, 
and often enough included in those contexts as politics, economics and 
social order. To repeat the trivial: cultures exist never on their own, they 
are one of the creative elements of the social world—shaping it and being 
themselves shaped by that world. Consequently my argument here will be 
rather versatile, tentatively moving to and fro between the institutional 
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levels of social organisation, political order, economic reproduction and 
legitimizing discourse. 
To be blunt: I reject the meaning of culture as a coherent unity; instead 
I prefer to use "culture" as a marker signifying the interplay between soft-
and hardware, or more to the point, between the imaginaire (incl. beliefs 
and world views as well as value- and symbol-systems) and the institutions 
(incl. the agencies of bureaucratic, political, military and economic power). 
Confrontational Histories 
Speaking of confrontational histories means to deliberately put 
histories into contrastive positions; an approach that aims at a disputatious 
method of narration, not at an ontological quality. 
To illustrate the deep divide between Indian and British cultures in 
the period in question it may be advisable to first take a short look at the 
British homeland. Politically Britain became a republic at a rather early 
date, i. e. roughly spoken, in the second half of the seventeenth century, 
which was a period of world-crisis and in Britain a revolutionary time. 
The state then was temporarily called "the Commonwealth". Interesting 
enough, that seventeenth century designation "Commonwealth" was, as 
we all know, transferred to the vast global empire the British later succeeded 
to establish within a time-span of less than 100 years. There was not a big 
difference in being treated as a subject of the Empire or as a subject of the 
Commonwealth of Nations. Yet, "Commonwealth of nations" did not 
mean much; it more or less was and remained a void formula, maybe useful 
for propagandistic ventures. To quote from Hannah Arendt's chapter on 
Imperialism: "the British Commonwealth was never a 'Commonwealth 
of Nations' but the heir of the United Kingdom, one nation dispersed 
throughout the world. [...] Instead of conquering and imposing their own 
law upon foreign peoples, the English colonists settled on newly won 
territory in the four corners of the world and remained members of the 
same British nation." (Arendt 1951, 127-128) I would like to add, that 
to call India under colonial rule a nation' would have been a grotesque 
misunderstanding. Looking at the territorial and cultural multifariousness 
of the subcontinent, it is quite plausible to fall into line with Immanuel 
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Wallerstein and read the label "India" as an indexical sign indicating an 
invention made up of Asian and European ingredients (Wallerstein 1991, 
130-134). 
One of the advantages of the British political system in competing with 
other European nations for the domination over non-European countries 
was the centralisation of power including monetary and taxation matters. 
The big, in those times newly founded, soon globally acting capitalist 
investment companies—the Bank of England and the East India Company 
as well as the South Sea Company—conferred for some time their capital 
stocks as non-repayable credits on the government. In exchange they 
received, besides the payment of interest, first-rate privileges comprising, 
as in the case of the East India Company, the monopoly of free trade and 
of warfare in the territories chosen for conquest. It was only a question of 
time that out of the fusion between the imperial colonialism and a clever 
financial policy emerged that dubious system of world-capitalism, the 
historian Niall Ferguson recently deemed worthy to justify as one of the 
great British achievements. 
The success of British empire-building was to a large part due to those 
early established structures of a "fiscal-military state" (J. Brewer) that were 
accepted, sustained and promoted by a large majority of the English society. 
By this consent the society fostered a model of political organisation that 
owed its infrastructural strength to the absence of such despotic power 
plays which are the hallmark of an absolute or an autocratic kingship. 
At the same time power distance (G. Hofstede) was gradually reduced 
and participation of citizens in the process of political decision-making 
enhanced. And another, not to be underestimated advantage was provided 
by the fact that value-orientation was endorsed by a homogenous religious 
belief: Anglican Evangelicalism, protestant ethics added as a free bonus. 
The situation on the Indian subcontinent of that time was quite the 
reverse. Here the British struggle for hegemony was confronted with 
an almost unimaginable diversity of languages, poly-ethnic lifestyles, 
heterogeneous belief systems, power structures and traditional green 
economies. In encountering each other, both sides must have experienced 
the particular foreignness of the other. A passage out of a recently published 
Indian history book may illustrate that: 
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Concepts like state, sovereignty, society, nationality and nationhood 
conveyed in the English language", the author notes, "were quite 
new to the Indian mind. More appealing to it, were the ideas of 
human rights and dignity which had no place in the caste system. 
The personal feudal authority that prevailed in the country was 
replaced by the impersonal authority of law, a radical change that 
restored to the individual his legal personality, irrespective of his 
religion and caste. The rule of law that the British introduced 
implied both sanctity and supremacy of law and legal equality 
between individual and individual. It has prohibited arbitrary 
exercise of authority. The British [...] in their administrative 
behaviour and social belief, were essentially secular. (Sadasivan 
2000, 472) 
This is certainly a well fitting statement with the exception of the last 
sentence—the British, were they really "essentially secular"? To put that 
straight, it needs some laborious arguments, but it is worth to run that path 
because it will lead us into the core of that conflict which finally escalated 
into a bloody religious war, a war that shattered all what had been attained 
during the longstanding Anglo-Indian commerce: I mean the Great 
Rebellion or Great Mutiny, that started in Delhi about 150 years ago, in 
the Indian summer of 1857. 
Regarding the religious dimension of the British-Indian tensions it is 
important to know, that the Mughals in general were good Muslims, but 
secular-minded rulers. The emperor Akbar (1542-1605), a great seeker of 
truth like Gandhi, had set the pattern for his successors in the Timurid 
lineage. In his courtly bureaucracy he included Indian elites of different 
religions, but was at the same time anxious to enhance the authority of the 
king's charismatic rule by sacralizing his person. So he established a ritual 
cult around his person and was venerated as an incarnation of Divine Faith 
{Din-i Ildhi), without, however, forcing an exclusive religious doctrine 
upon his subjects. What is more, he invited the leading figures of different 
confessions of his time (Sikhs, Hindus, Jains, Zoroastrians etc.) including 
representatives of the Portuguese Jesuits to engage in a cross-cultural 
religious dialogue taking place in the beautiful audience hall in his newly 
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built capital Fatehpur Sikri (City of Victory) near Agra. Having a greatly 
tolerant attitude toward religion, Akbar even preserved Hindu temples. 
Since Akbars days most Mughal kings were venerated as the legitimate 
rulers furnished with a divine authority that made them acceptable for 
Muslims, Hindu and other people alike. The title of the last Mughal, 
Bahadur Shah Zafar (1775-1862), who died as a British state-prisoner in 
Rangoon, might give a clue to the imaginary transcendence of the emperor's 
cultural as well as political position. It reads: 'His Divine Highness, Caliph 
of the Age, Padsha as Glorious as Jamshed, He who is surrounded by Hosts 
of Angels, Shadow of God, Refuge of Islam, Protector of the Mohammedan 
Religion, Offspring of the House of Timur, Greatest Emperor, Mightiest 
King of Kings, Emperor son of Emperor, Sultan son of Sultan' (Dalrymple 
2006, 21). It goes without saying that such a highly charged charismatic 
authority was determined to emphasize hierarchy and to sustain a good deal 
of power distance. 
Perhaps the most important factor of success at least in the early times 
of the British dominion in India was the existence of an initially private 
enterprise and its competent and, often enough, ruthless way of economic 
and political decision-making: the East India Company. Established 
in 1600 as a joint-stock association of English merchants, the Company 
was transformed during the second half of the eighteenth century from a 
commercial body with scattered trading interests into an almost invincible 
territorial power. As a headquarter she had founded the settlement of 
Calcutta in Bengal, from where the Company's armies subjugated in 
unparalleled efforts step by step the whole sub-continent. Despite being 
a private entrepreneur, the Company was by official privilege allowed to 
recruit her own mercenary army; and she did so well that her chief militaries 
soon had command over the biggest army in the world of that time, a 
stunning war-machine useful to expand British interests into vast parts 
of Central Asia. To finance subsequent expenses the Company extracted 
considerable, progressively rising revenues from the Indian peasantry, in 
such a way spreading poverty and impeding what in the British homeland 
formed part of the economic progress, the intensification of agrarian 
productivity. One of the quasi-philosophical convictions behind this 
economy of exploitation was a contemporary mixture of physiocratic and 
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utilitarian ideas, which to a steadily rising degree during the nineteenth 
century were unfortunately joined by racism and cultural arrogance. "All 
the capital employed is English capital;" wrote John Stuart Mill in the early 
years of the Victorian era, "almost all the industry is carried on for English 
uses" (quote Said 1993, 90). And Lord Macaulay, who had to deal with 
the reform of public education in India, assisted with his infamous verdict 
"that a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native 
literature of India and Arabia." 
The East India Company was active on the sub-continent more than 
250 years. Her climax she had in 1800 when her army under command 
of Lord Wellesley overthrew Tipu Sultan near Mysore. In his report 
to the Court of Directors of the East India Company Wellesley wrote: 
"The glorious termination of the late war in Mysore [has] established 
the ascendancy of the British power over all the States of India", from 
now on—he continued—it would be essential, "to consider the extensive 
and valuable possessions to the government of which the Company have 
succeeded, as a great Empire." (Martin 1836, II; 312, 320) 
More than half a century later, in 1858, one year after the Great 
Rebellion—or as Indian historians call the incident: after the First War 
of Independence—the Company was nationalised, and thus became 
the property of the British Government, her duties being reduced to 
administrative tasks. The seizure of power by the Government initiated 
a policy of rigid control and oppression in the new "Empire", organized 
directly by the newly established governmental India Office in London. 
In the long history of her existence the Company underwent a lot of 
drastic changes. That was, to a large part, due to the almost impossible 
task to occupy and pacify a continent so vast in geographical size and so 
abundant in cultural differences. The Company was certainly not from the 
beginning involved in the task of empire-building, but steadily channelled 
the expertise of her Anglo-Indian personal in this direction, with 
increasing enforcement since the second half of the 18th century, when the 
Parliament in London tightened control by conveying power to the figure 
of a Governor-General; a commitment that raises a lot of questions. 
Again and again the Company, like the colonial policy altogether, 
was accused, to have pursued nothing else but the naked exploitation of 
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the foreign cultures and societies. However, to criticise that policy with 
Hannah Arendt for a type of imperialism characterised by the strict 
separation between ius and imperium, does not hit the point correctly. No 
question, the primary interest of the Company was directed at economic 
success. But to secure this purpose she first and foremost had to take care 
to keep up stability in the already colonised parts of the continent. To 
attain her goals she not only boosted police and military measures, she also 
assumed tasks that were, strictly speaking, of the politico-cultural sort. It 
is impossible to describe and hardly possible to generalise the efforts of the 
Company as a cultural agent in India. Too wide apart were the regional 
peculiarities and too various the attempts to intervene without ravaging the 
cultural memories of Hindus and Muslims. If we would venture on a rough 
summary of what is reported about the Company's goals we could perhaps 
reduce these to a broad prospect of those achievements which represent the 
basics of modernity in the British society of that time: I mean: 
1. the culture of capitalism, since long a highlight of British 
entrepreneurship; 
2. the culture of industrialism, gaining speed and innovative impulse; 
3. the culture of surveillance, enhanced by new algorhythmic 
technologies and statistics; 
4. and last not least the culture of reflexivity with its tendency to 
deconstruct traditions and leave their normative contents to be 
scrutinized, interpreted and brought into distance by academic 
experts of European origin; experts, who, for instance, in variance 
with the autochthonous guardians of heritage, declared Sanskrit a 
holy language with affinities to classical Greek and Latin. 
Imperialist colonialism exerted a tremendous impact upon those media 
of communication and symbolic world-making: language and writing. The 
rather late introduction of printing in India at the end of the eighteenth 
century had a profound standardizing effect on the development of 
languages and literatures. Until then a multitude of co-existing languages 
and writing systems was in use. But now there emerged the ambition to 
conquer the imaginations and reasonings of the few literate by establishing 
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the leadership of at least two main literary languages: Urdu, using the 
Arabic script, and Hindi, using like Sanskrit, Marathi and others the 
Devanagari alphabet. 
Traces of all this can be found in many of the Company's activities. 
They include not only the establishment of schools and colleges under 
British supremacy, but also the more academic attainments like 
territorialisation by map-making, philological and historical reconstruction 
of languages, myths and chronicles, also—especially in the early decades 
of the nineteenth century—extensive surveillance through census and 
population-statistics and, not to forget, the heavy European investments 
into those enterprises which were thought to speed up the mechanisms 
of commerce and communication throughout the whole subcontinent: 
instalment of roads, railways, canals and the electric telegraph. "In purely 
agricultural pursuits," the Indian historian Romesh Dutt wrote in 1900 
in his retrospect on India's economic development, "England had little 
to teach; but in cleaning and husking the food grains, in spinning and 
weaving, in the manufacture of indigo, tobacco and sugar, in the growing 
of coffee and tea, in the forging of iron, in coal-mining and gold-mining, 
in all industries which were dependant on machinery, Europe had adopted 
more perfect methods than India in 1830." 
Dutt , like so many other Indians, would have been happy if their own 
people would have had the opportunity to partake in and hence to learn 
from the technological advancements. Instead, Dutt comments, "it was 
hardly possible that foreign merchants and rival manufacturers, working 
for their own profit, would have this object in view [...]. A policy the reverse 
was pursued with the object of replacing the manufactures of India, as far 
as possible, by British manufactures." (Dutt 1956, 288) 
The ambivalence of this radical, enduring scheme of transforming 
the sub-continent by keeping investment in one's own labour forces and 
the collected taxes on the domestic side soon became only too obvious. 
On the one hand the interventions initiated a process of modernisation 
which in the long run nurtured especially in the British educated Indian 
elite a longing for self-determination that culminated in the struggle for 
independence; out of this the Indian nationalist movement was born, 
whose members invented, as docile disciples of the European historians, 
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their own nationally tainted cultural memory, only to use it as a weapon 
against their former 'masters'. On the other hand the colonialist process 
of transformation went along with the destruction not only of holy sites 
(temples and mosques) and the basic structures of the traditional village 
economy, disrupting the local ecological balances, but it also affected the 
normative impact of those cultural memories that in the manifold empires 
and kingdoms of that wide-stretched subcontinent had established for 
generations a readily comprehensible set of life-orienting traditions. Not 
to forget the influence of other cultural heritages embodied in different 
religious beliefs, e.g. Buddhism, Jainism and Islam. 
To call the various Hindu-religious observances and rituals "Hinduism" 
was a typical Western attitude meant to simplify a complex phenomenon 
and to reduce a disturbing heterogeneity. Apart from the Trinity Brahma— 
Vishnu—Shiva, the rich polytheistic pantheon of Hindu-deities is almost 
inexhaustible, what mirrors the possibilities of manifold forms of adoration 
and worship. Accordingly confusing is, therefore, the teeming crowd of the 
holy imagery. Another big difference to the monotheistic confessions lies 
in the major importance of oral interpretations and teachings, something 
that cut across the Protestant estimation of the written word, a guiding 
principle also in the Anglican Church. All in all, enough reasons for many 
British functionaries who had to do in some form or other with the affairs 
of colonizing or, as they saw it, civilizing the Indians, to qualify the Hindu-
religions as a gross form of superstition. 
The greatest danger for a sustainable mutual understanding 
between Europeans and Indians pertaining to the interchangeable 
uses of their cultures was brought about by the awakening of religious 
fundamentalism about the middle of the nineteenth century. There was a 
growing estrangement between both sides, stimulating a general negative 
development that was to a good deal pressed ahead by the coincidence of 
a crisis-ridden and therefore weak government in the British homeland on 
the one hand and successful imperialist policies in the colony on the other 
hand. The latter encouraged a boisterous attitude towards the natives" 
as the Indians were then disdainfully called. "For the first time", resumes 
William Dalrymple in his recent book about that time, "there was a feeling 
that technologically, economically and politically, as well as culturally, 
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the British had nothing to learn from India and much to teach; it did not 
take long for imperial arrogance to set in. This arrogance, when combined 
with the rise of Evangelical Christianity, slowly came to affect all aspects 
of relations between the British and the Indians." (Dalrymple 2006, 70) 
The militant strategies of the Evangelical missionaries strengthened the 
resistance of their Hindu and Islamic antagonists. And it was a question of 
time when the first 'mujahedin' conspiracies were uncovered and a ' j ihad' 
against the 'Kafirs', the infidels, was invoked. The consequence was one of 
the bloodiest upheavals in the history of British colonialism, the 1857 war, 
that once and for all destroyed the rich Mughal culture and shattered for a 
long time all hopes for fair dealings between India and Europe. 
Intermediary cultures 
My brief and very selective outline of the British-Indian relations is not 
meant to convey the impression that the British were the first and only who 
happened to incorporate the Indian subcontinent into the modern world 
system. There is something like a very early beginning of this process dating 
back to the arrival of Vasco da Gama at the West-coast of the subcontinent 
by the end of the 15th century. Certain commercial routes [carreiras) 
were officially mapped out by the Portuguese, and quite similar national 
monopoly-like conditions applied as later in the Northwestern European 
East India companies. When Panikkar in his famous book on Asia and 
Western Dominance names the era between 1498 and 1945—almost 450 
years—the "Vasco Da Gama Epoch", it seems that he is alluding not only 
to a long-lasting continuity of Western dominance but also to a long and 
not only hostile history of commercial and cultural exchange between 
Asia and Europe. After all, the Portuguese called their growing network 
of commercial settlements on the West-coast "Estado da India". This is, I 
think, a definite clue to the task of empire-building in those days and an 
anticipation of that unifying label "State of India" that came into use only 
after the Indians had cast off the colonial dominance of the imperialist 
powers. 
In the beginning the Portuguese were primarily interested, as later 
the British, in the trade with India. Soon, however, they fostered rising 
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imperialistic tendencies and started to conquer small parts of the Indian 
territory, and to draw in the catholic missionaries. So at first sight the 
common collaboration of military violence and ideological brainwashing 
seems to have been the dominant sign also of this cultural encounter. Yet, 
new historical studies were able to substantiate co-operative attitudes on 
both sides, Indian and Portuguese, and there is now a fairer assessment of 
the formerly underrated symptoms of mutual acceptance and recognition 
(Feldbauer 2004). 
Let me elaborate a bit on that other side of the history in the following 
conclusion: So far I avoided those well-known theoretical key words: 
orientalism (sensu Said), hegemony (sensu Gramsci) and hybridity (sensu 
Rushdie). And I do not think that they are absolutely essential. Since all 
cultures are syncretic, hybridity does not have any distinctiveness and 
doesn't it have rather ominous roots in nineteenth century race theories 
(Young 1994)? Particularly, India is a fabulous example for denominating 
in an outspoken manner various cross-cultural amalgamations as there are 
Hindu-Muslim communalism and architecture, Indo-Islamic civilization, 
Indo-Persian art, or Anglo-Indian literature. The two other key words 
mentioned above originate from normative political contexts: The fight for 
hegemony of a "social bloc" (Gramsci) presupposes the developed nation 
state, which does not apply to India in the time treated here; let alone the 
fact that the social system in that part of the world had not a class-, but a 
caste-structure. As to orientalism this is a polemical key word, which in 
the Saidian discourse has certainly shown a notably illuminative force, 
notwithstanding, however, the fact that it underestimates the creative 
power, which might emerge out of the encounter of different cultures in 
the secluded realm of interpretive research and narration. 
I prefer to speak of intermediary cultures instead of using the above 
mentioned somewhat outworn key words. The term intermediary culture 
is introduced here as a merger with a subversive potential, convenient to 
designate a new form developing between forms already existing. Meant 
is not simply the intersection of the characteristics shared by A and B. 
It rather means the dynamic conjuncture and cooperative interaction 
between the two, out of which may emerge a hitherto unknown form. This 
new form often has a transitory function, and the concept could hence also 
Imperial Culture and the Culture of Imperialism 235 
be called culture in transition. My decisive argument is, that the agency of 
the intermediary culture shows up as something creative, especially when 
it succeeds to transform the given structures of A and B. The implied 
action mode being based on shared intentions, its rationality can be called 
"responsive" (B. Waldenfels). The efforts, for instance, of the Portuguese 
Jesuits as well as of the European philological scholars to comprehend 
the foreign cultures of the Indian peoples may be appreciated as being 
committed to that principle of responsive rationality. The point is, they 
experience the otherness of the foreign culture as if they themselves were 
asked questions by the other and should strive for acceptable answers. 
Sometimes their answers will certainly be unsatisfactory, but even then 
they may empathetically intrude into the self-perception of the culture in 
question and develop alternative views that might be in some way examined 
and appropriated by the other side. The question-and-answer-game will, 
if it brings profit for both sides, never come to a halt and can unleash a 
constant exchange of roles since it relies, like a dialogue, on reciprocity: the 
asked one becomes the questioner, the answering person the questioned et 
vice versa. 
The question-and-answer-game forms the core of the intermediary 
culture. Its objective outcome consists, however, not only of statements 
and texts. In fact its yield often has an organizational consequence, which 
for some time can change the determining factors of political, social or 
cultural practice. The British, who around 1800 took over the life-style 
of the Indian Nawabs or Rajahs, put on test the principle of responsive 
rationality not only in a discursive, but first and foremost in a mimetic way. 
Their assimilative practice was an attempt to understand the strangeness of 
the other culture by living the way of life of the others. 
When the emperor Akbar initiated a dialogue with the other religions 
and began to integrate the Hindu elite into the political culture of the 
Moghul court, this initiative of an intermediary cultural practice produced 
flexible and durable new power constellations. If, on the contrary, responsive 
rationality is prohibited by an assault on the other culture, be it religiously 
or politically motivated, the question-and-answer-game cannot unfold. 
Exactly that happened under one of Akbar's later successors, Aurangzeb 
(1658-1707), who via adjustment of rigid boundaries between the religions 
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carved the way for the decline of Moghul power. When the British stepped 
in with upgraded imperialist and combined fundamentalist, i.e. religiously 
narrow-minded claims, they brought down the symbolic power of the last 
Mughal in Delhi and sparked off a cruel war. 
My attempt to depict some of the confrontations and interdependencies 
between imperial cultures and cultural imperialism within a specific span 
of historical time in India is not meant to proof a clear-cut theoretical 
hypothesis. Intermediary cultures may emerge under whatever condition. 
It is an open secret, after all, that the policy of neither an imperial nor 
an imperialist power is particularly suitable for the advancement of the 
freedom to practice what I called 'responsive rationality'. But I hope I 
have not completely failed to indicate that none of the two power-systems 
can totally rule out the burgeoning of intermediary and at the same time 
subversive cultures. 
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